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This paper presents a new atomic commitment protocol, enhanced
three phase commit (E3PC), that always allows a quorum in the system
to make progress. Previously suggested quorum-based protocols (e.g.,
the quorum-based three phase commit (3PC) (Skeen, 1982)), allow
a quorum to make progress in case of one failure. If failures cascade,
however, and the quorum in the system is ‘‘lost’’ (i.e., at a given time
no quorum component exists), a quorum can later become connected
and still remain blocked. With our protocol, a connected quorum never
blocks. E3PC is based on the quorum-based 3PC (Skeen, 1982), and
it does not require more time or communication than 3PC. We describe
how this protocol can be exploited in a replicated database setting,
making the database always available to a majority of the sites. ] 1998
Academic Press
1. INTRODUCTION
Reliability and availability of loosely coupled distributed
database systems are becoming requirements for many
installations, and fault tolerance is becoming an important
aspect of distributed systems design. When sites crash, or
when communication failures occur, it is desirable to allow
as many sites as possible to make progress. A common way
to increase the availability of data and services is replication.
If data are replicated in several sites, they can still be
available despite site and communication-link failures.
Protocols for transaction management in distributed and
replicated database systems need to be carefully designed in
order to guarantee database consistency. In this paper we
present a novel atomic commitment protocol (ACP) that
always allows a majority (or quorum) to make progress. We
describe how this protocol can be exploited in a replicated
database setting, making the database always available to a
majority of the sites.
In distributed and replicated database systems, when a
transaction spans several sites, the database servers at all
sites have to reach a common decision regarding whether
the transaction should be committed or not. A mixed
decision results in an inconsistent database, while a unani-
mous decision guarantees the atomicity of the transaction
(provided that the local server at each site can guarantee local
atomicity of transactions). To this end an atomic commitment
protocol, such as two phase commit (2PC) [Gra78], is
invoked. The atomic commit problem and the two phase
commit protocol are described in Section 3. Two phase
commit is a blocking protocol: if the coordinator fails, all the
sites may remain blocked indefinitely, unable to resolve the
transaction.
To reduce the extent of blocking, Skeen suggested the
quorum-based three phase commit (3PC) protocol, which
maintains consistency in spite of network partitions
[Ske82]. In case of failures, the algorithm uses a quorum (or
majority)-based recovery procedure that allows a quorum
to resolve the transaction. If failures cascade, however, and
the quorum in the system is ‘‘lost’’ (i.e., at a certain time no
quorum component exists), a quorum of sites can become
connected and still remain blocked. Other previously
suggested quorum-based protocols (e.g., [CR83, CK85])
also allow a quorum to make progress in case of one failure,
while if failures cascade, a quorum can later become connec-
ted and still remain blocked. To our knowledge, the only
previously suggested ACP that always allows a quorum to
make progress is the ACP that we construct in [Kei94].
The protocol in [Kei94] is not straightforward; it uses a
replication service as a building block, while the protocol
presented in this paper is easy to follow and self-contained.
In this paper we present the enhanced three phase commit
(E3PC) protocol, which is an enhancement of the quorum-
based 3PC [Ske82]. E3PC maintains consistency in the
face of site failures and network partitions: sites may crash
and recover, and the network may partition into several
components1 and remerge. E3PC always allows a quorum to
make progress: At any point in the execution of the
protocol, if a group G of sites becomes connected, and this
group contains a quorum and no subsequent failures occur
for sufficiently long, then all the members of G eventually
reach a decision. Furthermore, every site that can com-
municate with a site that has already reached a decision will
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also, eventually, reach a decision. An operational site that is
not a member of a connected quorum may be blocked, i.e.,
may have to wait until a failure is repaired in order to
resolve the transaction. This is undesirable but cannot be
avoided; Skeen proved that every protocol that tolerates
network partitions is bound to be blocking in certain
scenarios [SS83].
E3PC achieves higher availability than 3PC simply by
carefully maintaining two additional counters and with no
additional communication. The principles demonstrated in
this paper can be used to increase the resilience of a variety
of distributed services, e.g., replicated database systems, by
ensuring that a quorum will always be able to make
progress. Other protocols that use two counters in order to
allow a majority to make progress are given in [MHS89,
CT96, KD96, Lam89, DLS88].
Numerous database replication schemes that are based
on quorums have been suggested [Gif79, Her86, Her87,
EASC85, EAT89]. These algorithms use quorum systems to
determine when data objects are accessible. In order to
guarantee the atomicity of transactions, these algorithms
use an ACP and therefore are bound to block when the
ACP they use blocks. Thus, with previously suggested
ACPs, these approaches do not always allow a connected
majority to update the database. Using E3PC these
protocols can be made more resilient. In Section 6 we
describe in detail how E3PC may be incorporated into
accessible copies protocols [EASC85, EAT89], in order to
make the database always available to a quorum.
E3PC uses a perfect fault detector: Every site has accurate
information regarding which sites are connected to it. In
Section 7 we discuss unreliable failure detectors [CT96,
DFKM96] and the ability of our protocol to work with
such failure detectors. In this case, the protocol solves the
weak atomic commit problem [Gue95].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2
presents the computation model. Section 3 provides general
background on the atomic commitment problem. The
quorum-based three phase commit protocol [Ske82] is
described in Section 4, and enhanced three phase commit is
described in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe how E3PC
can be exploited in replicated database systems. In Section 7
we describe the protocol’s behavior with an unreliable
failure detector. Section 8 concludes the paper. In the
Appendix we formally prove the correctness of E3PC.
2. THE MODEL
Our protocol is applicable in an asynchronous message-
passing environment. The set of sites running the protocol is
fixed and is known to all the sites. The sites are connected
by an underlying communication network that provides
communication between any pair of connected sites. We
consider the following types of failures: failures may partition
the network, and previously disjoint network components
may remerge; messages may be lost or delivered out of
order. Sites may crash and recover; recovered sites come up
with their stable storage intact. We assume that messages
are neither corrupted nor spontaneously generated by the
network.
Failures are detected using a fault detector: Every site has
accurate information regarding which sites are connected to
it. This assumption is weakened in Section 7.
3. BACKGROUNDDISTRIBUTED
TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT
This section provides general background on the atomic
commit problem and protocols.
3.1. Problem Definition
A distributed transaction is composed of several subtrans-
actions, each running on a different site. The database
manager at each site can unilaterally decide to abort the
local subtransaction, in which case the entire transaction
must be aborted. If all the participating sites agree to
commit their subtransaction (vote Yes on the transaction)
and no failures occur, the transaction should be committed.
We assume that the local database server at each site can
atomically execute the subtransaction once it has agreed to
commit it.
In order to ensure that all the subtransactions are con-
sistently committed or aborted, the sites run an atomic
commitment protocol such as two phase commit. The
requirements of atomic commitment (as defined in Chap-
ter 7 of [BHG87]) are as follows:
AC1: Uniform Agreement: All the sites that reach a deci-
sion reach the same one.
AC2: A site cannot reverse its decision after it has
reached one.
AC3: Validity: The commit decision can be reached only
if all sites voted Yes.
AC4: Non-triviality: If there are no failures and all sites
voted Yes, then the decision will be to commit.
AC5: Termination: At any point in the execution of the
protocol, if all existing failures are repaired and no new
failures occur for sufficiently long, then all sites will even-
tually reach a decision.
3.2. Two Phase Commit
The simplest and most renowned ACP is two phase com-
mit [Gra78]. Several variations of 2PC have been suggested
(e.g., presume abort and presume commit [MLO86]); the
simplest version is centralizedone of the sites is designated
as the coordinator. The coordinator sends a transaction (or
request to prepare to commit) to all the participants. Each
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site answers by a Yes (‘‘ready to commit’’) or by a No
(‘‘abort’’) message. If any site votes No, all the sites abort.
The coordinator collects all the responses and informs all
the sites of the decision. In absence of failures, this protocol
preserves atomicity. Between the two phases, each site
blocks, i.e., keeps the local database locked, waiting for the
final word from the coordinator. If a site fails before its vote
reaches the coordinator, it is usually assumed that it had
voted No. If the coordinator fails in the first phase, all the
sites remain blocked indefinitely, unable to resolve the last
transaction. The centralized version of 2PC is depicted in
Fig. 1.
Commit protocols may also be described using state
diagrams [SS83]. The state diagram for 2PC is shown in
Fig. 1. The circles denote states; final states are double-
circled. The arcs represent state transitions, and the action
taken (e.g., message sent) by the site is indicated next to
each arc. In this protocol, each site (either coordinator or
participant) can be in one of four possible states:
q: initial stateA site is in the initial state until it decides
whether to unilaterally abort or to agree to commit the
transaction.
w: wait stateIn this state the coordinator waits for
votes from all of the participants, and each participant waits
for the final work from the coordinator. This is the ‘‘uncer-
tainty period’’ for each site, when it does not know whether
the transaction will be committed or not.
c: commit stateThe site knows that a decision to com-
mit was made.
a: abort stateThe site knows that a decision to abort
was made.
The states of a commit protocol may be classified along two
orthogonal lines. In the first dimension, the states are divided
into two disjoint subsets: The committable states and the non-
-committable states. A site is in a committable state only if it
knows that all the sites have agreed to proceed with the trans-
action. The rest of the states are noncommittable. The only
committable state in 2PC is the commit state. The second
dimension distinguishes between final and non-final states.
The final states are the ones in which a decision has been
FIG. 1. The centralized two phase commit protocol.
made and no more state transitions are possible. The final
states in 2PC are commit and abort.
3.3. Quorums
In order to reduce the extent of blocking in replication
and atomic commit protocols, majority votes or quorums
are often used. A quorum system is a generalization of the
majority concept. E3PC, like Skeen’s quorum-based three
phase commit protocol [Ske82], uses a quorum system to
decide when a group of connected sites may resolve the
transaction. To enable maximum flexibility the quorum
system may be elected in a variety of ways (e.g., weighted
voting [Gif79]). The quorum system is static; it does not
change in the course of the protocol.
The predicate Q(S) is true for a given subset S of the sites
iff S is a quorum. The requirement from this predicate is that
for any two sets of sites S and S$ such that S & S$=<, at
most one of Q(S) and Q(S$) holds, i.e., every pair of
quorums intersect. For example, in the simple majority
quorum system Q(S) is true iff |S|>n2, where n is the
total number of sites running the protocol. Numerous
quorum systems that fulfill these criteria were suggested. An
analysis of the availability of different quorum systems may
be found in [PW95].
For further flexibility, it is possible to set different
quorums for commit and abort (this idea was presented in
[Ske82]). In this case, a commit quorum of connected sites
is required in order to commit a transaction, and an abort
quorum is required to abort. For example, to increase the
probability of commit in the system, one can assign smaller
quorums for commit and larger ones for abort.
In this case, the quorum system consists of two pre-
dicates: QC(G) is true for a given group of sites G iff G is
a commit quorum, and QA(G) is true iff G is an abort
quorum. The requirement from these predicates is that for
any two groups of sites G and G$ such that G & G$=<, at
most one of QC(G) and QA(G$) holds, i.e., every commit
quorum intersects every abort quorum.
3.4. The Extent of Blocking in Commit Protocols
The 2PC protocol is an example of a blocking protocol:
operational sites sometimes wait on the recovery of failed
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sites. Locks must be held in the database while the transac-
tion is blocked. Even though blocking preserves con-
sistency, it is highly undesirable because the locks acquired
by the blocked transaction cannot be relinquished, render-
ing the data inaccessible by other requests. Consequently,
the availability of data stored in reliable sites can be limited
by the availability of the weakest component in the dis-
tributed system.
Skeen et al. [SS83] proved that there exists no non-
blocking protocol resilient to network partitioning. When a
partition occurs, the best protocols allow no more than one
group of sites to continue while the remaining groups block.
Skeen suggested the quorum-based three phase commit
protocol, which maintains consistency in spite of network
partitions [Ske82]. This protocol is blocking in case of par-
titions; it is possible for an operation site to be blocked until
a failure is mended. In case of failures, the algorithm uses a
quorum (or majority)-based recovery procedure that allows
a quorum to resolve the transaction. If failures cascade,
however, a quorum of sites can become connected and still
remain blocked. Skeen’s quorum-based commit protocol is
described in Section 4.
Since completely non-blocking recovery is impossible to
achieve, further research in this area concentrated on mini-
mizing the number of blocked sites when partitions occur.
Chin et al. [CR83] define optimal termination protocols
(recovery procedures) in terms of the average number of sites
that are blocked when a partition occurs. The average is over
all the possible partitions and all the possible states in the
protocol in which the partitions occurs. The analysis deals
only with states in the basic commit protocol and ignores the
possibility for cascading failures (failures that occur during
the recovery procedure). It is proved that any ACP with
optimal recovery procedures takes at least three phases and
that the quorum-based recovery procedures are optimal.
In [Kei94] we construct an ACP that always allows a
connected majority to proceed, regardless of past failures.
To our knowledge, no other ACP with this feature was
suggested. The ACP suggested in [Kei94] uses a reliable
replication service as a building block and is mainly suitable
for replicated database systems. In this paper, we present a
novel commitment protocol, enhanced three phase commit,
which always allows a connected majority to resolve the
transaction (if it remains connected for sufficiently long).
E3PC does not require complex building blocks, such as
the one in [Kei94], and is more adequate for partially
replicated or nonreplicated distributed database systems; it
is based on the quorum-based three phase commit [Ske82].
4. QUORUM-BASED THREE PHASE COMMIT
In this section we describe Skeen’s quorum-based commit
protocol [Ske82]. E3PC is a refinement of 3PC, and there-
fore we elaborate on 3PC before presenting E3PC. The
basic three phase commit is described in Section 4.1, and the
recovery procedure is described in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3
we show that with 3PC, a connected majority of the sites
can be blocked. We present a simplified version of 3PC that
uses the same quorums for commit and abort.
4.1. Basic Three Phase Commit
The 3PC protocol is similar to two phase commit, but in
order to achieve resilience, another non-final ‘‘buffer state’’
is added in 3PC, between the wait and the commit states:
pc: pre-commit stateThis is an intermediate state
before the commit state and is need to allow for recovery. In
this state the site is still in its ‘‘uncertainty period.’’
The quorum-based 3PC is described in Fig. 2, and a
corresponding state diagram is depicted in Fig. 3a. The
commit and pre-commit states of 3PC are committable states;
a site may be in one of these states only if it knows that all
the sites have agreed to proceed with the transaction. The
rest of the states are non-committable. In each step of the
protocol, when the sites change their state, they must write
the new state to stable storage before replying to the
message that caused the state change.
4.2. Recovery Procedure for Three Phase Commit
When a group of sites detect a failure (a site crash or a
network partition) or a failure repair (site recovery or merge
of previously disconnected network components), they run
the recovery procedure in order to try to resolve the transac-
tion (i.e., commit or abort it). The recovery procedure con-
sists of two phases: first elect a new coordinator, and next
attempt to form a quorum that can resolve the transaction.
A new coordinator may be elected in different ways (e.g.,
[GM82]). In the course of the election, the coordinator
hears from all the other participating sites. If there are
failures (or recoveries) in the course of the election, the elec-
tion can be restarted.2
The new coordinator tries to reach a decision as to
whether the transaction should be committed or not and
tries to form a quorum for its decision. The protocol must
take the possibility of failures and failure repairs into
account and, furthermore, must take into account the
possibility of two (or more) different coordinators existing
concurrently in disjoint network components. In order to
ensure that the decision will be consistent, a coordinator
must explicitly establish a quorum for a commit or an abort
decision. To this end, in the recovery procedure, another
state is added:
pa: pre-abort state. Dual state to pre-commit.
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2 Election is a weaker problem than atomic commitment; only the coor-
dinator needs to know that it was elected, while the other sites may crash
or detach without ever finding out which site was elected.
FIG. 2. The quorum-based three phase commit protocol.
FIG. 3. Three phase commit and the recovery procedure. q: initial state; w: wait; pc: pre-commit; c: commit; pa: pre-abort; a: abort.
FIG. 4. The quorum-based recovery procedure for three phase commit.
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FIG. 5. The decision rule for the quorum-based recovery procedure.
The recovery procedure is described in Fig. 4. The state
diagram for the recovery procedure is shown in Fig. 3b. The
dashed lines represent transitions in which this site’s state
was not used in the decision made by the coordinator. Con-
sider for example the following scenario: site p1 reaches the
pre-abort state during an unsuccessful attempt to abort.
The network then partitions, and p1 remains blocked in the
pre-abort state. Later, a quorum (that does not include p1)
is formed, and another site, p2 , decides to commit the trans-
action (this does not violate consistency, since the attempt
to abort has failed). If now p1 and p2 become connected, the
coordinator must decide to commit the transaction, because
FIG. 6. Three phase commit blocks a quorum.
p2 is committed already. Therefore, p1 makes a transition
from pre-abort to commit.
After collecting the states from all the sites, the coor-
dinator tries to decide how to resolve the transaction. If
any site has previously committed or aborted, then the
transaction is immediately committed or aborted accord-
ingly. Otherwise, the coordinator attempts to establish a
quorum. A commit is possible if at least one site is in the
pre-commit state and the group of sites in the wait state
together with the sites in the pre-commit state form
a quorum. An abort is possible if the group of sites in
the wait state together with the sites in the pre-abort
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state form a quorum. The decision rule is summarized in
Fig. 5.
4.3. Three Phase Commit Blocks a Quorum
In this section we show that in the algorithm described
above, it is possible for a quorum to become connected and
still remain blocked. In our example, there are three sites
executing the transaction: p1 , p2 , and p3 . The quorum
system we use is a simple majority: every two sites form a
quorum. Consider the following scenario depicted in Fig. 6.
p1 is the coordinator. All the sites vote Yes on the trans-
action. p1 receives and processes the votes, but p2 and p3
detach from p1 before receiving the pre-commit message
sent by p1 .
p2 is elected as the new coordinator. It sees that both p2
and p3 are in the wait state and therefore sends a pre-abort
message, according to the decision rule. p3 receives the
pre-abort message, acknowledges it, and then detaches
from p2 .
Now, p3 is in the pre-abort state, while p1 is in the
pre-commit state. If now p1 and p3 become connected, then
according to the decision rule, they remain blocked, even
though they form a quorum.
Analysis. In this example, it is actually safe for p1 and p3
to decide pre-abort, because none of the sites could have
committed, but it is not safe for them to decide pre-commit,
because p3 cannot know whether p2 has aborted or not.
We observe that p3 decided pre-abort ‘‘after’’ p1 decided
pre-commit, and therefore we can conclude that the
pre-commit decision made by p1 is ‘‘stale,’’ and no site has
actually reached a commit decision following it, because
otherwise, it would have been impossible for p2 to reach a
pre-abort decision.
The 3PC protocol does not allow a decision in this case,
because the sites have no way of knowing which decision
was made ‘‘later.’’ Had the sites known that the a pre-abort
decision was made ‘‘later,’’ they could have decided
pre-abort again and would have eventually aborted the
transaction. In E3PC, we provide the mechanism for doing
exactly this.
5. THE E3PC PROTOCOL
We suggest a three phase atomic commitment protocol,
enhanced three phase commit, with a novel quorum-based
recovery procedure that always allows a quorum of sites to
resolve the transaction, even in the fact of cascading failures.
The protocol is based on the quorum-based three phase
commit protocol [Ske82]. E3PC does not require more
communication or time than 3PC; the improved resilience is
achieved simply by maintaining two additional counters,
which impose a linear order on quorums formed in the
system.
Initially, the basic E3PC is invoked. If failures occur, the
sites invoke the recovery procedure and elect a new coor-
dinator. The new coordinator carries on the protocol to
reach a decision. If failures cascade, the recovery procedure
may be reinvoked an arbitrary number of times. Thus, one
execution of the protocol (for one transaction) consists of
one invocation of the basic E3PC and of zero or more
invocations of the recovery procedure.
In Section 5.1 we describe how E3PC enhances 3PC. The
recovery procedure for E3PC is described in Section 5.2. In
Section 5.3 we show that E3PC does not block a quorum in
the example of Section 4.3. In Section 5.4 we outline the
correctness proof for E3PC. We first present a simplified
version of E3PC that uses the same quorums for commit
and abort. In Section 5.5 we describe a more general version
of E3PC, which uses different quorums for commit and abort.
5.1. E3PC: Enhancing Three Phase Commit
The basic E3PC is similar to the basic 3PC, the only dif-
ference being that E3PC maintains two additional counters.
We now describe these counters. In each invocation of the
recovery procedure, the sites try to elect a new coordinator.
The coordinators elected in the course of an execution of the
protocol are sequentially numbered: A new ‘‘election num-
ber’’ is assigned in each invocation of the recovery proce-
dure. Note that there is no need to elect a new coordinator
in each invocation of the basic 3PC or E3PC; the re-election
is needed only in case failures occur. The coordinator of the
basic E3PC is assigned ‘‘election number’’ one, even though
no elections actually take place. The following two counters
are maintained by the basic E3PC and by the recovery pro-
cedure:
LastElectedThe number of the last election that this
site took part in. This variable is updated when a new coor-
dinator is elected. This value is initialized to one when the
basic E3PC is invoked.
LastAttemptThe election number in the last attempt
this site made to commit or abort. The coordinator changes
this variable’s value to the value of LastElected whenever
it makes a decision. Every other participant sets its Last
Attempt to LastElected when it moves to the pre-commit
or to the pre-abort state, following a pre-commit or a
pre-abort message from the coordinator. This value is
initialized to zero when the basic E3PC is invoked.
These variables are logged on stable storage. The second
counter, LastAttempt, provides a linear order on
pre-commit and pre-abort decisions; e.g., if some site is in
the pre-commit state with its LastAttempt=7, and
another site is in the pre-abort state with its Last
Attempt=8, then the pre-commit decision is ‘‘earlier’’ and
therefore ‘‘stale,’’ and the pre-abort decision is safe. The
first counter, LastElected, is needed to guarantee the
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uniqueness of the LastAttempt,3 i.e., that two different
attempts will not be made with the same value of Last
Attempt (cf. Lemma 3 in the Appendix).
Notation. We use the following notation:
v P is the group of sites that are live and connected, and
which take part in the election of the new coordinator.
v MaxElected is maxp # P(LastElected of p).
v MaxAttempt is maxp # P(LastAttempt of p).
v IsMaxAttemptCommittable is a predicate that is
true iff all the members that are in non-final states and
whose LastAttempt is equal to MaxAttempt are in a com-
mittable state (i.e., in the pre-commit state). Formally,
IsMaxAttemptCommittable is true iff \p # P(Last
Attempt of p=MaxAttempt 7 p is in a non-final state  p
is in a committable state).
As in 3PC, the recovery procedure is invoked when
failures are detected and when failures are repaired. Sites
cannot ‘‘join’’ the recovery procedure in the middle; instead,
the recovery procedure must be reinvoked to let them take
part.
All the messages sent by the protocol carry the election
number (LastElected ) and process id of the coordinator.
Thus, it is possible to know in which invocation of the
protocol each message was sent. A site that hears from a
new coordinator ceases to take part in the previous invoca-
tion that it took part in and no longer responds to its pre-
vious coordinator. Messages from previous invocations are
ignored. Thus, a site cannot concurrently take part in two
invocations of the recovery procedure. Furthermore, if a
site responds to messages from the coordinator in some
invocation, it necessarily took part in the election of that
coordinator.
The recovery procedure for E3PC is similar to the
quorum-based recovery procedure described in Section 4.2.
As in 3PC, in each step of the recovery procedure, when the
sites change their state, they must write the new state to
stable storage before replying to the message that caused the
state change. The recovery procedure is described in Fig. 7.
The possible state transitions in E3PC and its recovery pro-
cedure are the same as those of 3PC, depicted in Fig. 3; the
improved performance in E3PC results from the decision
rule, which allows state transitions in more cases.
In Step 3 of the recovery procedure, r collects the states
from the other sites in P and tries to reach a decision. The
sites are blocked until r receives enough states to allow a
decision. It is possible to reach a decision before collecting
the states from all the sites in P; e.g., when a final state is
received, a decision can be made. It is also possible to reach
a decision once states are collected from a quorum, if one of
the quorum members has LastAttempt=MaxAttempt.
We denote by S the subset of P from which r received the
state so far; r constantly tries to compute the decision using
the states in S, whenever new states arrive and until a
decision is reached. The decision rule is described below.
If the decision is not block, r changes LastAttempt to
LastElected, and multicasts the decision to all the sites
in P.
Decision rule. The coordinator collects the states from
the live members of P and applies the following decision
rule to the subset S of sites from which it received the state.
v If there exists a site (in S) that is in the aborted
stateabort.
v If there exists a site in the committed statecommit.
v If IsMaxAttemptCommittable is true and S is a
quorumpre-commit.
v If IsMaxAttemptCommittable is false and S is a
quorumpre-abort.
v Otherwiseblock.
The decision rule is summarized in Fig. 8. It is easy to see
that with the new decision rule, if a group of sites is a
quorum, it will never be blocked.
5.3. E3PC Does Not Block a Quorum
In E3PC, if a group of sites forms a quorum, the latter will
never be blocked. This is obvious from the decision rule: if
some site has previously committed (aborted), then the
decision is commit (abort). Otherwise, a decision can
always be made according to the value of IsMax
AttemptCommittable.
We now demonstrate that E3PC does not block with the
scenario of Section 4.3 (in which Skeen’s quorum-based
3PC does block). In this example, there are three sites
executing the transactionp1 , p2 , and p3and the quorum
system is a simple majority: every two sites form a quorum.
We considered the following scenario, depicted in Fig. 9:
v Initially, p1 is the coordinator. All the sites vote Yes on
the transaction. p1 receives and processes the votes, but p2
and p3 detach from p1 before receiving the pre-commit
message sent by p1 . Now LastAttemptp1 is 1 while Last
Attemptp2 = LastAttemptp3 = 0, and the value of Last
Elected is one for all the sites.
v p2 is elected as the new coordinator, and the new
LastElected is two. It sees that both p2 and p3 are in the
wait state and therefore sends a pre-abort message, accord-
ing to the decision rule, and moves to the pre-abort state
while changing its LastAttempt to two. p3 receives the
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3 The value of LastElected is not guaranteed to be unique; two elections
may be made with the same value of LastElected, in case the first election
with this number did not terminate successfully at all the members. Also
note that the same coordinator cannot be chosen with the same election
number twice.
FIG. 7. The recovery procedure for E3PC.
pre-abort message, sets its LastAttempt to two, sends an
acknowledgment, and detaches from p2 .
v Now, p3 is in the pre-abort state with its value of
LastAttempt=2, while p1 is in the pre-commit state with
its LastAttempt=1. If now p1 and p3 become connected,
then, according to the decision rule, they decide to
pre-abort the transaction, and they do not remain blocked.
5.4. Correctness of E3PC
In the Appendix we formally prove that E3PC fulfills the
requirements of atomic commitment described in Sec-
tion 3.1. In this section we outline the proof.
First we prove that two contradicting attempts (i.e.,
pre-commit and pre-abort) cannot be made with the same
value of LastAttempt (Lemma 3). This is true due to the
fact that every two quorums intersect and that a quorum of
sites must increase LastElected before a pre-commit or a
pre-abort decision. Moreover, LastAttempt is set to the
value of LastElected, which is higher than the previous
value of LastElected of all the participants of the recovery
procedure. Next, we prove that the value of LastAttempt at
each site increases every time the site changes state from a
committable state to a non-final, non-committable state,
and vice versa (Lemma 5).
FIG. 8. The decision rule for E3PC.
Using the two lemmas above we prove (Lemmas 6 and 8):
If the coordinator reaches a commit (abort) decision upon
receiving a quorum of ACKs for pre-commit (pre-abort)
when setting its LastAttempt to i, then for every ji no
coordinator will decide pre-abort (pre-commit) when set-
ting its LastAttempt to j. We prove these lemmas by induc-
tion on ji; we show, by induction on j, that if some coor-
dinator r sets its LastAttempt to j in Step 3 of the recovery
procedure, then IsMaxAttemptCommittable is true
(false) in this invocation of the recovery procedure, and
therefore, the decision is pre-commit (pre-abort).
We conclude that if some site running the protocol
commits the transaction, then no other site aborts the
transaction.
5.5. Using Different Quorums for Commit and Abort
In this section we describe how to generalize E3PC to
work with different quorums for commit and abort. Commit
and abort quorums are described in Section 3.3. The follow-
ing changes need to be made in the protocol:
1. In the second phase of the basic E3PC, the coor-
dinator waits for a commit quorum of ACKs before sending
pre-commit.
2. In Step 5 of the recovery procedure, the coordinator
needs to wait for a commit quorum of ACKs in order to
pre-commit, and for ACKs from an abort quorum in order
to pre-abort.
3. Likewise, the decision rule is slightly changed to
require a commit quorum in order to pre-commit (in case
IsMaxAttemptCommittable is true) and an abort
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FIG. 9. E3PC does not block a quorum.
quorum in order to pre-abort (if IsMaxAttemptCom-
mittable is false). The resulting decision rule is shown in
Fig. 10.
It is easy to see from the new decision rule that if a group
of processes is both a commit quorum and an abort
quorum, it does not remain blocked.
The correctness proof of the general version of E3PC is
similar to the correctness proof of E3PC presented in this
paper; we use the property that every commit quorum inter-
sects every abort quorum in order to prove that two con-
tradicting attempts (i.e., pre-commit and pre-abort) cannot
FIG. 10. The decision rule for E3PC with commit and abort quorums.
be made with the same value of LastAttempt. The formal
proof may be found in [KD94].
6. REPLICATED DATABASE SYSTEMS
In replicated database systems, the sites continuously
execute transactions. When the network partitions, it is
often desirable to allow a quorum of the sites to access the
database, but it is usually undesirable to allow sites in two
disjoint network components to concurrently update the
same data. Numerous replication schemes that are based on
quorums have been suggested [Gif79, Her86, Her87,
EASC85, EAT89]. In order to guarantee the atomicity of
transactions, these algorithms use an ACP and therefore are
bound to block when the ACP they use blocks. We propose
to use E3PC in conjunction with these protocols in order to
make the database always available to a quorum.
The same quorum system should be used to determine
when the data are accessible to a group of sites as for the
atomic commitment protocol. In a fully replicated database,
a group of sites needs to be a quorum of the total number
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of sites in order to access the database. Hence, in order to
resolve a transaction using the E3PC recovery procedure, a
group of sites needs to be a quorum of the total number of
sites and not just of the sites that invoked E3PC for the
specific transaction.
If the data are partially replicated, then for each item
accessed by this transaction, a quorum of the sites it resides
on is required. In order to resolve a transaction using the
E3PC recovery procedure, a group of sites needs to contain
a quorum for each item accessed by this transaction.
There is a subtle point to consider with this solution: sites
that did not take part in the basic E3PC for this transaction
may take part in the recovery procedure. The local data-
bases at such sites are not up-to-date, since they do not
necessarily reflect the updates performed by the current
transaction. Therefore, these sites need to recover the
database state from other sites during the merge and before
taking part in the recovery procedure. In the accessible
copies protocols [EASC85, EAT89], this is done every time
the view changes. In this case, we suggest using the view
change as the ‘‘fault detector’’ for E3PC; thus, the recovery
procedure is always invoked following a view change, after
all the participating sites have reached an up-to-date state.
Below, we describe in detail how E3PC may be incor-
porated into accessible copies protocols.
6.1. Using E3PC with Accessible Copies Protocols
Accessible copies protocols [EASC85, EAT89] maintain
a view of the system to determine when data are accessible:
A data item can be readwritten within a view (component)
only if a majority of its readwrite votes are assigned to
copies that reside on sites that are members of this view.
This majority of votes is the ‘‘accessibility threshold for the
item,’’ not to be confused with read and write quorums used
within the current view. In order to guarantee the atomicity
of each transaction, these protocols use an ACP. We
propose to use E3PC as this ACP using these accessibility
thresholds as its quorum system. This way the sites that suc-
ceed in resolving the previous transaction are also allowed
to access the database in new transactions.
A group of sites is considered a quorum (in E3PC) if and
only if it contains a majority of the votes of each item
FIG. 11. E3PC adjusted to the accessible copies protocol.
accessed by this transaction. A connected quorum of the
sites may invoke a transaction and access the data. When
the sites running the transaction wish to commit it, they run
E3PC for the transaction. The basic E3PC may be invoked
by a subset of the sites, the members of the current view. The
views maintained by the accessible copies protocol are used
as fault detectors for E3PC; when the view changes, the
recovery procedure is invoked.
In the course of the view change protocol, each site
executes an update transaction in order to recover the most
up-to-date values of each data item. If the update transac-
tion is aborted, the view change is aborted; a successful view
change implies that the ‘‘newly joined’’ sites have success-
fully performed the updates and thus have given up their
right to unilaterally abort the transaction. When the
recovery procedure is invoked with sites that did not take
part in the basic E3PC for the current transaction, these
sites are considered to be in the wait state with their
LastElected=1 and LastAttempt=0, as if they had
voted Yes on the transaction, and detached.
Figure 11 summarizes the adjustments made in E3PC to
make it suitable for the accessible copies protocol. With this
protocol, the database is always available to a quorum of
connected sites. We know of no previous database replica
control protocol with this feature.
7. FAILURE DETECTORS AND WEAK ATOMIC COMMIT
The E3PC protocol presented in this paper uses a perfect
failure detector: Every site has accurate information regard-
ing which sites are connected to it. This assumption is not
practical: in asynchronous systems, it is not always possible
to tell failed sites from very slow ones. In practice, systems
use unreliable mechanisms, e.g., timeout, in order to detect
faults. Such mechanisms may make mistakes and suspect
that a correct (connected ) site is faulty (disconnected ).
Can we relax the perfect failure detection assumption?
Guerraoui [Gue95] proves that the atomic commit
problem, as defined in Section 3.1, cannot be solved without
a perfect failure detector; the non-triviality requirement
(AC4) is too strong. He defines the weak atomic commit
problem by changing the non-triviality requirement of
atomic commit as follows:
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Non-Triviality: If all sites voted Yes, and no site is ever
suspected, then the decision will be to commit.
The other requirements of atomic commit are unchanged.
The weak atomic commit problem can be solved with non-
perfect failure detectors.
Can the weak atomic commit be solved in a fully
asynchronous environment that is not augmented with any
failure detector? Unfortunately, the answer to this question
is no. In a fully asynchronous environment, reaching con-
sensus4 is impossible [FLP85], in the sense that every
protocol that reaches agreement is bound to have an infinite
run. In particular, using any failure detector that can be
implemented in such an environment, e.g., a time-out
mechanism, E3PC does not fulfill the termination (AC5)
requirement. However, when the protocol does terminate,
the rest of the requirements of weak atomic commit are
preserved.
7.1. Failure Detector Classes
We have seen that in order to solve weak atomic commit,
the model must be augmented with some failure detector.
Chandra and Toueg [CT96] classify failure detectors with
different levels of reliability. These failure detector classes
are defined in a crash-failure asynchronous environment. In
[DFKM96] these definitions are extended to the model
where network partitions may occur.
An eventual perfect failure detector (formally defined in
[CT96] and [DFKM96]) may suspect correct sites, but
there is a time after which correct sites are no longer sus-
pected. Using such a failure detector, E3PC solves the weak
atomic commit problem. E3PC terminates once a quorum
of sites becomes connected and no failures or suspicions
occur for sufficiently long. In a practical system, this
assumption is likely to be fulfilled.
Similarly, [CT96] and [DFKM96] define weaker classes
of failure detectors; Chandra et al. [CHT92] prove that the
weakest possible failure detector to solve consensus is the
eventual weak failure detector. Intuitively, an eventual weak
failure detector may make mistakes and suspect correct
sites, but there is a time after which there is some correct site
that is not suspected by any other site that is connected to
it. Guerraoui and Schiper [GS95] present a solution to the
weak atomic commit problem in an environment without
network partitions, using an eventual weak failure detector.
Their protocol may be adapted to work in an environment
with network partitions, using the technique presented in
[DFKM96]. This technique yields a protocol that is less
efficient (requiring more communication) than E3PC.
8. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we demonstrated how the three phase com-
mit [Ske82] protocol can be made more resilient simply by
maintaining two additional counters and by changing the
decision rule. The new protocol, E3PC, always allows a
quorum of connected sites to resolve a transaction: At any
point in the execution of the protocol, if a group G of sites
becomes connected and this group contains a quorum of the
sites, and no subsequent failures occur for sufficiently long,
then all the members of G eventually reach a decision.
Furthermore, every site that can communicate with a site
that already reached a decision will also, eventually, reach
a decision. We have shown that 3PC does not possess this
feature: if the quorum in the system is ‘‘lost’’ (i.e., at a certain
time no quorum component exists), a quorum can later
become connected and still remain blocked.
E3PC does not require more communication or time than
3PC; the improved resilience is achieved simply by main-
taining two additional counters. The information needed to
maintain the counters is piggybacked on messages that are
sent in 3PC as well as in E3PC: the values of LastElected
and LastAttempt are attached to messages used to elect a
new coordinator.
We discussed how E3PC can be extended to work in an
environment with unreliable failure detectors. In this case,
the protocol solves the weak atomic commitment problem.
E3PC may be used in conjunction with quorum-based
replication protocols, such as [Gif79, Her86, Her87,
EASC85, EAT89], in order to make the database always
available to a quorum. We demonstrated how E3PC may be
incorporated in accessible copies protocols [EASC85,
EAT89]; with the new protocol, the database is always
available to a quorum of connected sites. The technique
demonstrated here may be used to make other algorithms
more resilient, e.g., an algorithm for maintaining a primary
component in the network, to support processing of sequen-
ces of distributed transactions, as well as for ordering of
messages [KD96] and replication [Kei94]. In [YKLD97,
DKYL96] we exploit this technique in a dynamic voting
scheme for maintaining the primary component in the
network.
APPENDIX: CORRECTNESS PROOF OF E3PC
In this section we prove the correctness of E3PC; we show
that E3PC and its recovery procedure fulfill the requirements
of atomic commitments (as defined in Chapter7 of [BHG87])
described in Section 3.1. The proof follows:
AC1: Uniform Agreement: In Theorem 1 below we
prove that all the sites that reach a decision reach the same
one.
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4 Guerraoui [Gue95] proves that the weak atomic commit problem is
reducible to consensus.
AC2: In our protocol, a site cannot reverse its decision
after it has reached one. When a site in a final state (commit
or abort) participates in some invocation of the recovery
procedure, the decision in this invocation of the recovery
procedure will correspond with its state.
AC3: Validity: The commit decision can be reached only
if all sites voted Yes: In the basic E3PC, a committable deci-
sion can be made only if all the sites vote Yes. If the recovery
procedure is invoked with no site in a committable state,
then according to the decision rule, a committable decision
cannot be reached.
AC4: Non-triviality: If there are no suspicions during the
execution of basic E3PC, then the basic E3PC succeeds in
reaching a decision. If all sites voted Yes, then the decision
is commit. Since we assume a perfect failure detector, if
there are no failures, there are no suspicions. Without a
perfect failure detector, the weak non-triviality requirement
(defined in [Gue95] and Section 7) is fulfilled.
AC5: Termination: At any point in the execution of the
protocol, if all existing failures are repaired and no new
failures occur for sufficiently long, then all sites will even-
tually reach a decision. Our protocol guarantees a much
stronger property: At any point in the execution of the
protocol, if a group G of sites becomes connected and this
group contains a quorum of the sites, and no subsequent
failures occur for sufficiently long, then all the members of
G eventually reach a decision. Furthermore, every site that
can communicate with a site that already reached a decision
will also, eventually, reach a decision. This property is
immediate from the decision rule and from our assumption
that the failure detector is perfect. This property is also
fulfilled with an eventual perfect failure detector, since with
such a failure detector, there is a time after which correct
sites are no longer suspected.
We now prove that the decision made is unanimous, i.e.,
that if one site decides to commit, then no site can decide to
abort and vice versa.
Lemma 1. If a coordinator r sets its local value of
LastAttempt to i and sends a pre-commit (pre-abort) mes-
sage to the participants in Step 3 of the recovery procedure,
then a quorum of sites have set their value of LastElected
to i during the same invocation of the recovery procedure.
Proof. It is immediate from the protocol and from the
fact that sites cannot ‘‘join’’ the recovery procedure in the
middle, but rather the protocol must be reinvoked to let
them take part. K
Lemma 2. At each site, the value of LastElected never
decreases.
Proof. The value of LastElected is modified only in
Step 2 of the recovery procedure, when it is changed to
MaxElected+1. A site may execute Step 2 only if it took
part in the election of the coordinator in that invocation of
the recovery procedure and its value of LastElected was
used to compute MaxElected, and therefore MaxElected
LastElected, and LastElected increases. K
Lemma 3. If two sites, p and q, both set their Last
Attempt to the number i without changing to a final state,
then either both of them set their LastAttempt to i as a
response to a pre-commit decision or both of them set their
LastAttempt to i as a response to a pre-abort decision.
Proof. A coordinator changes the value of Last
Attempt when it reaches a decision (in Step 3 of the recovery
procedure or in the basic E3PC), and it remains in a non-
final state if the decision is pre-commit or pre-abort. Other
sites change the value of LastAttempt only in response to
a pre-commit or a pre-abort decision, in Step 4 of the
recovery procedure, or in response to pre-commit in the
basic E3PC.
Assume the contrary; then w.l.o.g., p set its LastAttempt
to i in response to a pre-commit decision in the course of
some invocation, I0 , of the recovery procedure (or of the
basic E3PC), and q, in response to a pre-abort decision, in
an invocation I1 . From Lemma 1, a quorum of sites set their
LastElected to i in invocation I0 and another quorum of
sites set their LastElected to i in invocation I1 . Since the
coordinator in invocation I0 decided to pre-commit and the
coordinator in I1 decided to pre-abort, I0 and I1 were dif-
ferent invocations of the recovery procedure or of the basic
E3PC.
Since every two quorums intersect, there exists a site, s,
that set its LastElected to i in both invocations. W.l.o.g., s
set its LastElected to i in I0 before setting it to i in I1 . From
the protocol, a site cannot concurrently take part in two
invocations of the recovery procedure; furthermore, if a site
responds to messages from the coordinator in some invoca-
tion, it necessarily took part in the election of that coor-
dinator. Therefore, s took part in the election of the coor-
dinator in I1 , after it set its LastElected to i, and from
Lemma 2, in the course of the election, the coordinator
heard from s that its value of LastElectedi and deter-
mined that MaxElectedi. The new value of LastElected
for this invocation was MaxElected+1, which is greater
than i, which contradicts our assumption. K
Lemma 4. At each site, at any given time, LastElected
LastAttempt.
Proof. From Lemma 2, the value of LastElected never
decreases, so it is sufficient to show that LastAttempt is
never increased to exceed it. We prove this by induction on
the steps of the protocol in which LastAttempt changes
base: When E3PC is initiated, LastElected is set to one,
and LastAttempt, to zero. Step: Whenever LastAttempt is
changed in the course of the protocol, it takes the value of
LastElected. K
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Lemma 5. The value of LastAttempt at each site
increases every time the site changes state from a committable
state to a non-final, non-committable state and vice versa. The
value of LastAttempt never decreases.
Proof. The only non-final committable state is pre-
commit, and the only way to switch to a pre-commit state
is in response to a pre-commit decision, when setting Last
Attempt to LastElected. Likewise, the only way to switch
from a committable state to a non-final, non-committable
state is in Step 3 or in Step 4 of the recovery procedure, in
response to a pre-abort decision, when setting LastAttempt
to LastElected.
It is sufficient to prove that LastAttempt increases
when it is set to LastElected in Step 3 or 4 of the recovery
procedure, i.e., that LastAttempt<LastElected before
Step 3. And indeed, in Step 2, LastElected is set to
MaxElected+1, which is greater than the value of
LastElected was when the recovery procedure was initial-
ized. From Lemma 4, LastElectedLastAttempt at all
times; therefore, before Step 3, LastElected is greater
than LastAttempt. K
Lemma 6. If the coordinator reaches a commit decision
upon receiving a quorum of ACKs for pre-commit when set-
ting its LastAttempt to i, then for every ji no coordinator
will decide pre-abort when setting its LastAttempt to j.
Proof. By induction on j . Base ( j=i): This is immedi-
ate from Lemma 3. Step: We now assume that no coordi-
nator decides pre-abort with LastAttempt=k for every
j>ki, and prove for j. From the assumption, no site can
be in a non-final, non-committable state with its j>Last
Attempti. Now, assume some coordinator r sets its
LastAttempt to j in Step 3 of the recovery procedure, we
have to show that r did not decide pre-abort during this
invocation of the recovery procedure. Assume the con-
trary; then r collected states, from a quorum of sites with
LastAttempt< j, and therefore, in this invocation Max
Attempt< j. Since every two quorums intersect, at least
one member of G, p took part in this invocation of the
recovery procedure and sent its state to r. Since j> i, from
Lemma 5, p set its LastAttempt to i (and switched to a
committable state) before this invocation. But, no site can
be in a non-final, non-committable state with its j>Last
Attempti, and therefore IsMaxAttemptCommittable
is true in this invocation, which contradicts the assump-
tion that r decides pre-abort. K
Lemma 7. If the coordinator reaches a commit decision
when setting its LastAttempt to i, then for every ji no
coordinator will decide pre-abort when setting its Last
Attempt to j.
Proof. There are two cases to consider:
v If the coordinator reaches a commit decision upon
receiving a quorum of ACKs for pre-commit when setting
its LastAttempt to i, then from Lemma 6 for every ji no
coordinator will decide pre-abort when setting its Last
Attempt to j.
v If the coordinator reaches a commit decision during
the recovery procedure upon receiving a commit state,
then some coordinator has reached a commit decision
before, when its LastAttempt was <i. We go back, by
induction, to the first coordinator that reached a commit
decision. This coordinator must have reached a commit
decision according to the previous case. Thus, we can con-
clude that for every ji no coordinator will decide
pre-abort when setting its LastAttempt to j. K
Lemma 8. If the coordinator reaches an abort decision
upon receiving a quorum of ACKs for pre-abort when set-
ting its LastAttempt to i, then for every j i no coordinator
will decide pre-commit when setting its LastAttempt to j.
Proof. This lemma is dual to Lemma 6 and can be
proven the same way. K
Lemma 9. If the coordinator reaches an abort decision
when setting its LastAttempt to i, then for every j i no
coordinator will decide pre-commit when setting its Last
Attempt to j.
Proof. There are three cases to consider:
v If the coordinator reaches an abort decision during
the basic E3PC, this decision is reached because some site
voted No on the transaction. In this case, the coordinator
does not pre-commit, and no site reaches a committable
state in the course of the protocol. Note: If the recovery
procedure is invoked with no site in a committable state,
then according to the decision rule, a committable decision
cannot be reached.
v If the coordinator reaches an abort decision during
the recovery procedure upon receiving a quorum of ACKs
for pre-abort when setting its LastAttempt to i, then
from Lemma 8 for every j i no coordinator will decide
pre-commit when setting its LastAttempt to j.
v If the coordinator reaches an abort decision during
the recovery procedure upon receiving an abort state,
then some coordinator has reached an abort decision
before, when its LastAttempt was <i. We go back, by
induction, to the first coordinator that reached an abort
decision, according to one of the previous two cases, and
conclude that for every ji no coordinator will decide
pre-commit when setting its LastAttempt to j. K
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Theorem 1. If some site running the protocol commits
the transaction, then no other site aborts the transaction
and vice versa.
Proof. A site may commit (abort) only upon hearing
a commit (abort) decision from its coordinator. Assume
that a commit or abort decision was reached for some
transaction T. Note: It is possible for more than one coor-
dinator to reach a decision for the same transaction. Let i
be the lowest value of LastAttempt that a coordinator
had when reaching a commit or abort decision. There are
two cases to consider:
1. Some coordinator reached an abort decision when
setting its LastAttempt to i: Assume for the sake of con-
tradiction that some coordinator also reached a commit
decision, and let j be the lowest value of LastAttempt of
a coordinator reaching a commit decision. From the
assumption, j i. Furthermore, since j is the lowest value
of LastAttempt of a coordinator reaching a commit deci-
sion, no site could have started this invocation of the
recovery procedure in the committed state, and the com-
mit decision must have been preceded by a pre-commit.
But from Lemma 9 no coordinator can decide pre-commit
when setting its LastAttempt to j, and we reach a con-
tradiction.
2. Some coordinator reached a commit decision when
setting its LastAttempt to i: The proof is similar to the
proof of Case 1 above, but there is one more case to con-
sider: An abort decision reached in the course of the basic
E3PC (not in the recovery procedure) is not preceded by a
pre-abort decision. In this case, LastAttempt is set to 1,
and the commit decision could not have been reached with
a lower value of LastAttempt; therefore i=1. This case
reduces to Case 1 proved above. K
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